Here we present a more detailed version of the stylized though formal model from the text, intended to capture the contest for control of the capital (net assets) in a closed-end funds and whose aim is to provide empirical predictions.
A.1 Preliminaries
The closed-end fund (CEF) owns an asset whose date-t market value (net asset value or NAV) is C t and which provides a continuous dividend stream ∆×C t . All market valuations are performed on a risk-adjusted basis and interest rates are normalized to zero.
1 For capital-markets to be in equilibrium, it must be that the asset depreciates at a rate of ∆ per unit time (i.e., C t+τ = C t e −τ∆ ) so that C t = PV(dividends) = ∫ ∆×C t+τ dτ = ∆×C t ∫ e −τ∆ dτ .
(1)
By law, the dividend ∆ must be distributed to shareholders by the CEF, net of any fees. Consider now a CEF with the following attributes: Shareholders receive an additional liquidating dividend of δ ≥ 0, the manager has the ability to enhance the asset's growth by an additional rate of α ≤ ∆, and the manager charges a fee of k times the NAV (i.e., k × C t ). The variable, ∆+δ, can be viewed as a managed distribution policy (MDP). If these conditions are maintained in perpetuity, the total value of the asset, including the contribution of active management and without deducting fees, is V t = PV(dividends) = ∫ (∆+δ)C t+τ dτ = C t × (∆+δ)/(∆−α+δ).
Through the stream of fees, the manager effectively owns a share of V t . Assuming that these policies are constant through time and there is no threat of liquidation, the market value of the manager's share is M t = ∫ kC t+τ dτ = kC t ∫ e − τ(∆−α+δ) dτ = C t × k/(∆−α+δ),
so the shareholders' value is
Consequently, the CEF premium is given by prem t = P t / C t − 1 = (α−k)/(∆−α+δ).
If k -α > 0 then a permanent increase in δ will lead to an increase in P t and in the premium, as well as a decrease in M t . Thus, whenever the CEF is at a discount, a liquidating dividend can serve as a method of transferring ownership from the fund manager to the shareholders, thereby shrinking the discount. This simple comparative static illustrates the wealth transfer induced by an MDP. 2 What the simple calculation does not answer is why a manager of a CEF would agree to a wealth transfer via an MDP, and how the market's anticipation of such an event affects the price of the CEF before the MDP is adopted. We turn to address these questions.
A.2 Modeling Shareholder Activism
Suppose that k -α > 0, meaning that in the absence of a policy change, the fund would trade at a discount according to Eq. (5). 3 We are now going to consider the possibility of shareholder action: Forced liquidation by an activist shareholder, together with the possibility of a response by management via a change in the liquidating dividend. For tractability, we'll assume the following timeline: there are five key dates, denoted by t = 0,1,2,3, and 4. While we continue to assume that dividends and fees are paid continuously, for the sake of analytic tractability, we assume that no payoffs are made between dates 0 and 4 (and that this is reflected in the NAV of the underlying asset). This is tantamount to assuming that the flow of payoffs from the asset under management between the date of a preemptive MDP announcement and a proxy battle is small relative to the total asset value.
t = 0:
The CEF management inherits a fund with parameters k, ∆, and α. It can then change δ (the baseline liquidation policy) such that δ 0 ≥ 0. The CEF's market value is set to reflect the subsequent possibility of a hostile attempt to liquidate the fund or force the management to change its policies. χ χ ∈ , is distributed uniformly and revealed to the activist at date 1 prior to deciding whether or not to initiate an attack; χ 1 represents the cost of information acquisition, opportunity costs, and setting up the minimal necessary infrastructure in preparation for a decision on whether to initiate a proxy fight.
5 t = 2 assumptions: The manager can react to the attack (should it take place) by selecting a liquidation dividend, δ 2 , to maximize the value of his or her contingent cash flows. 6 If an attack does not take place, then the CEF policies determined at date 0 are made permanent and no further attack can take place.
t = 3 assumptions:
The activist decides whether to proceed with a proxy fight. Initiating a proxy fight entails an expenditure of 3 3 where C 3 is the value of the asset at date-3, and 3
is revealed to the attacker at date-3 prior to determining whether or not to initiate a proxy fight.
From the point of view of dates earlier than date-3, � 3 is distributed uniformly. If the attacker backs down, the fund continues indefinitely under the policies determined at date-2.
t = 4 assumptions:
The shareholders vote to liquidate the fund (if a proxy fight was initiated at date-3) and receive a liquidating dividend of �1 − � � 4 , where C 4 is the value of the asset at date-4, or continue with the fund indefinitely under the policies adopted by the management at date-2. The liquidation cost, F is known to the shareholders prior to voting, but it is uniformly distributed on [0, � ] (with � ≤ 1) from the point of view of dates prior to date-4. We make the following assumptions about the parameters:
This set of inequalities ensures that the probabilities of initiating a proxy fight and the subsequent probability of liquidation are interior.
While the model is not fully dynamic, in that we only budget for a single opportunity at activism, our sense is that the economic tradeoffs can be equally well illustrated in our simpler flow, when the two flows have the same present value. Thus, when transferring wealth to shareholders, the manager prefers a liquidating dividend to a lump-sum payment or to a cut in fees (assuming all three transfer the same value from the manager to shareholders). When α is large, this intuition breaks down because a liquidating dividend is more inefficient than a fee reduction, as it both shifts ownership and reduces the overall value the manager brings to the asset through active management. CEFs do not exhibit a change in management fee subsequent to the adoption of an MDP, nor are they prone to unforced large-scale redemption of capital. Thus, by electing to only model the transfer of value through a liquidation dividend we are not sacrificing a great deal of realism.
setting. We solve the model via backward induction. We summarize the results below, leaving the detailed derivation and proofs to an online Appendix. , where δ 2 is determined at date 2. Notice that shareholders will never liquidate a fund unless k > α, which is assumed. Moreover, liquidation takes place if and only if the realized cost is less than the CEF discount,
(assuming the CEF is continued).
Thus, the probability of liquidation before F is revealed is
Where [ , ] − is the smaller of a and b. If the discount is higher than � then liquidation takes place for certain. Because > , there is no finite value of 2 that can rule out liquidation in case of a shareholder vote.
t = 3:
The activist will proceed with a proxy fight if the present value of such a fight, as calculated by the activist, is higher than the present value of accepting the policies adopted by the manager at date-2. A proxy fight will therefore take place if and only if
Where C 3 is the date-3 NAV. The first term on the left side of the inequality is the benefit to the activist from liquidation, weighed by the probability that shareholders vote for liquidation; the second term is the weighted benefit in case of a failed vote. The third term is the activist's cost of proceeding with a proxy battle. The right side of the inequality is the benefit to the activist from taking no action. Conditional on liquidation, the liquidation cost is distributed uniformly between 
If 3 χ is sufficiently low, a proxy fight will take place for sure. Moreover, because ℓ ( 2 ) > 0 and > , there is no finite 2 that rules out a proxy fight. We note that the inequality in (8) can be recast in terms of the discount of the fund, should it be allowed to continue without a contest, as ℓ ( 2 ) > 2 3 . I.e., an attack takes place if the future discount and probability of liquidation are sufficiently high. Both of these quantities, however, are endogenous and determined by the management's choice of 2 . Before 3 is revealed, the probability of a proxy fight can be calculated from (8) as
The second inequality in (6) implies that the likelihood of drawing a high 3 (cost of initiating a proxy fight) is high enough to guarantee that ( 2 ) ≤ ℓ ( 2 ).
t = 2:
The manager sets 2 by maximizing the value of his cash flows as follows
The term in the square bracket equals the probability of not having the fund liquidated (one less the probability of a proxy battle and subsequent liquidation). The total payoffs to the manager in the event of liquidation is zero because we assume no payoffs are made until date 4.
where [ , ] + is the larger of a and b.
. Finally, the CEF discount at date 2 is
The parameter is a measure of the strength of the MDP response to an activist's attack; from the activist's point of view, it measures the benefit of liquidation relative to the cost of a proxy fight. The parameter ( ) is a measure of the costly frictions preventing liquidation, and is therefore related to the discount subsequent to an optimal MDP response. The optimal MDP response to an initial attack is increasing in k-α and the holdings of the attacker (i.e., γ), while it is decreasing in the costs of initiating a proxy fight, in the cost of liquidation, and in the mandatory level of dividends, Δ. 7 Eq. (12) can be interpreted to say that the management reduces the discount to the point where it is in line with the liquidation frictions ( ( ) can be viewed as proportional to a harmonic mean of ̅ 3 and � , the frictions preventing liquidation). One can also see that, given an interior solution for the MDP (i.e., ≥ 1), the discount is not a function of the managerial expenses (i.e., k), asset payoffs (i.e., Δ), or managerial ability -this is because, as is evident from (11), the optimal MDP acts to offset the negative impact of k on shareholders and the positive impacts of Δ and α. We refer to ̅ and ̅ whenever = ̅ . 
t = 1:
The prospective attacker anticipates the manager's reaction (i.e., δ 2 ), and decides whether to pay χ 1 and initiate an attack by acquiring γ shares. Assuming shares are acquired, γ can be between 0 and ̅ , the maximum ownership allowed before the SEC requires disclosure of intent (e.g., 5%). The activist maximizes the following objective function:
P 1 is the price of a share bought, while C 1 is the NAV per share at date-1. The price is 'preattack', reflecting the fact that the activist's 'attack' is not observed prior to the purchase of shares, and thus the value of the CEF doesn't reflect that an attack has occurred until after the shares are purchased (i.e., at date 2). 8 The expected cost of a proxy-battle being initiated at date-3 is
(the probability of a proxy-battle being initiated times the expected cost conditional on initiation). Using (11), one can write 1 ( ) as,
In either case, 1 ( ) is convex in , meaning that its maximum in [0, ̅ ] is at a corner. Setting
8 Naturally, the P 1 incorporates the market's anticipation of a possible attack. This is analyzed in the t = 0 case.
One can now revisit Eq. (11) of Proposition 1 and substitute ̅ for in the various expressions.
Corollary to Proposition 1:
and the CEF discount at date 2 is
In examining (14), it is important to note that if 1 is sufficiently high, the activist will not initiate an 'attack' even if 1 = 0. This is a crucial difference from the activist's date-3 decision which always depends on the realized cost of a proxy battle. If 3 = 0 at date-3 then initiating a proxy battle is a free valuable option for the activist, and a proxy battle will take place. On the other hand, if 1 = 0 at date-1, then initiating an attack is not costless in expectations as long as ̅ 3 > 0. In particular, because market participants free-ride on the activist who pays the future costs of a proxy battle, and this is reflected in 1 , the manager can set an initial MDP policy to rule out an attack. Next, we analyze this in greater detail. t = 0: Let (δ 0 ) be the probability that an activist will acquire shares at date 1. The manager's objective function, as a function of the liquidation policy, δ 0 , is given by:
If there is no attack at date-1, the manager's capitalized fees are given by the first term. If there is an attack, then the manager's value function corresponds to the expression in (10). The following result describes the optimal policy at date-0.
. The optimal liquidation dividend policy is given by
The subsequent probability of attack is
Thus, if δ 0 > 0 then (δ 0 ) = 0 (i.e., preemption at date zero is decisive in the sense that it eliminates the possibility of a future attack). Finally, the date-0 discount is given by
The quantity ̅ measures the costs of initiating an attack relative to the future costs of a proxy battle and eventual liquidation. If it is low, then according to Eqs. (17) and (18), the manager will select a preemptive liquidation dividend that will ward off any future attack. On the other hand, if ̅ is not low, the manager will choose to distribute the minimum amount of payouts (i.e., 0 = 0). 9 In the latter case, the probability of a date-1 attack by an activist is strictly positive but also strictly less than one. The reason that the probability of attack must be strictly 9 Managers will not adopt a preemptive MDP in the case of a high cost of attack alongside low costs of a proxy battle and eventual liquidation. This is because the manager, given the high costs of attack, will prefer to adopt the MDP after an attack is initiated.
less than one is that the market prices it in, thus making it less profitable for the activist to attack in the first place. This feedback also plays an important role in Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2011).
If an attack is precluded by a preemptive MDP (i.e., if δ 0 = 0), then the discount is permanently set at the level indicated by Eq. (19). If an attack is possible, then the date-0 discount is strictly higher than the date-2 discount. Thus, an attack will be followed by a decline in the discount even if the management does not adopt an MDP. Figure 1A in the text summarizes the overall MDP strategy and its impact on the discount, probability of attack, and subsequent probability of a proxy battle and liquidation.
A.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 It should be clear that the manager will set 2 so that ℓ ( 2 ) ( 2 ) < 1.
One need therefore consider the case in which ( 2 ) < ℓ ( 2 ) = 1 and the case ( 2 ) ≤ ℓ ( 2 ) < 1. As 2 increases, it passes from the former region into the latter. In the first case, the manager optimizes
for which the solution to the first order condition is δ � = ( − )
, meaning that the probability of liquidation is ℓ �δ � � = � 3 � < 1, by (6). Thus the optimum in the first case must be a corner solution: the largest ̂ for which �̂� = 1, and corresponding to
In the second case, the manager optimizes
and the maximand is given by * in Eq. (11). Because ̂ is attainable in (21), * is the optimum and both ℓ ( 2 ) and ( 2 ) are interior at the optimum.
The value of the CEF (i.e., P 2 ), per unit of NAV (i.e., C 2 ), is given by
where the first term corresponds to the continuation value of the CEF in case of no eventual liquidation, and the second term is the contribution from possible liquidation. Plugging in the value for 2 * from Eq. (11), one obtains the desired result for the discount, 1 − 2 2 .
■

Proof of Proposition 2:
The manager optimizes his objective function:
Where the (δ 0 ) is the probability of an initiated attack at date-1. (δ 0 ) solves
where ( ) + is zero if a < 0 and a otherwise. The date-1 CEF price is set by the market's anticipation of an attack to
The first term is the payoff if there is no attack, while the second is the expected payoff conditional on an attack (and includes the expected payoff from liquidation). So the date-1 CEF discount (prior to an attack) reflects the possibility of a sequence of attacks, as well as the continuation value of the fund. Let 0 = Δ − + 0 . Because ( 2 ) and ℓ ( 2 ) are interior, one can use Proposition 1 to rewrite this as follows,
It's straight forward to check that (δ 0 ) = 1 is not a consistent solution, because by plugging that into Eq. (26) and substituting the results back into (24) one obtains a negative probability for (δ 0 ). After some algebra, one can combine Eqs. (26) and (24) which is also monotonic in δ 0 and admits only corner solutions. The corners are determined by the smallest δ 0 such that (δ 0 ) = 0 and by δ 0 = 0. In the former case, to completely rule out an attack, the manager has to consider the activist's calculation in Eq. (14) and set the dividend policy so that
If an attack has been completely ruled out, then
, giving δ 0 = δ 0 c where
To see which solution dominates, consider the manager's objective function, 0 ( 0 ), at the two corners:
with ( Here, we investigate whether MDP funds are able to raise more investment capital relative to non-MDP funds. We obtain data on capital changes for all funds in our sample from their NSAR filings with the SEC. The NSAR filings separately report the net proceeds from issuance of common stock and the capital expenditure for repurchase of common stock during each fiscalyear period. The issuance of common stock includes new shares issued through the automatic dividend reinvestment program and/or seasoned equity offering (mostly via rights offerings). We calculate the net change in common stock by subtracting share repurchase from share issuance.
We also obtain fiscal-year end net assets from NSAR filings and total distribution to common shareholders from annual reports. To facilitate comparison, we normalize all variables by the previous fiscal-year end net assets. Table A1 compares the net assets growth, distribution yield, and changes in equity capital between MDP funds and non-MDP funds during the 2001 to 2006 period. For each fund, we first compute the annual averages during the sample period. We require each fund to have a minimum of three year data available to be included in the analysis. We then compute the cross-fund averages separately for MDP and non-MDP groups. Finally, we report and test for the mean (median) differences between the two payout groups.
Consistent with our analysis in Table 3 of the paper, the annual growth rate in net assets for MDP funds is on average 5 percentage points lower than that for non-MDP funds (3.49% vs. 8.41%). The difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The annual total distribution is on average 10.59% for MDP funds, compared to 5.66% for non-MDP funds. The 5 percentage points difference (statistically significant at the 1 percent level) confirms that MDP funds distribute significantly more assets than non-MDP funds each year. Can MDP funds offset the higher distribution ratio by raising more investment capital? Consistent with the referee's conjecture, MDP funds on average issue 2.16% more and repurchase 1.34% less common stock than non-MDP funds. Putting together, the net issuance of common stock by MDP funds is on average 3.54% per annum higher than non-MDP funds. All differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better.
The evidence suggests that, although MDP funds tend to issue more common stock than non-MDP funds, the magnitude is not big enough to completely offset the negative impact of higher distribution on net assets. Combining this with the previous finding that MDP funds do not seem to perform worse than non-MDP funds, we believe the relative large decline in asset growth observed for MDP funds is mainly driven by the commitment to a high payout target. This table compares the management fees between MDP funds and non-MDP funds. For MDP funds, we report the mean (median) statistics for the average management fees during the three-year periods before and after the MDP adoption as well as the changes. For each MDP fund, we identify a control group of non-MDP funds that have the same investment objective and compute the mean (median) statistics during the same pre-MDP and post-MDP periods. We report the mean (median) difference between the MDP group and the non-MDP control group as well as the difference-in-difference results around MDP adoption. Panels A and B of the table present management fee statistics for the 16 reactive MDP funds and 21 pre-emptive MDP funds, respectively. Statistical significance for the mean (median) tests of 1% and 5% are indicated by ** and * respectively. Online Appendix E: , 1=Attack) . The regressors include: the fund TNA at the end of previous year; the fund age at the end of previous year; an indicator variable (Activist Attack) that equals one if the fund was ever attacked by activist shareholders in the previous three years; the average institutional holdings in the previous year; the share illiquidity measured by the average daily Amihud illiquidity ratio of fund shares in the previous year; the leverage ratio in the previous year; the asset illiquidity measured by the first-order serial correlation of monthly NAV returns in the previous three years; the management fee in the previous year; an indicator variable (Mgt Ownership) that equals one if more than 10% of common shares were beneficially controlled by board members and executive officers in the previous year; the accumulated unrealized capital gains as a percentage of year-end TNA in the previous year; and the fourfactor alpha based on the monthly NAV returns in the previous three years. All variables except the indicator variables are standardized by subtracting the mean and scaling by the standard deviation of all funds in any given year. We also control for style fixed effects based on the Wall Street Journal style classification. We report the correlation coefficient (Rho) between the two error terms. The Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors are calculated. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance of 1% and 5% are indicated by ** and * respectively. Online Appendix F: Table A5 .
All Funds Domestic Equity Funds
Bivariate Probit with At-Inception MDP Funds
This table investigates how various fund characteristics affect its MDP adoption and activist attack using bivariate Probit regressions. The dependent variables are the MDP Event (0=No-MDP, 1=MDP) and the Activist Attack (0=No-Attack, 1=Attack). The regressors include: the fund TNA at the end of previous year; the fund age at the end of previous year; an indicator variable (Activist Attack) that equals one if the fund was ever attacked by activist shareholders in the previous three years; the average institutional holdings in the previous year; the share illiquidity measured by the average daily Amihud illiquidity ratio of fund shares in the previous year; the leverage ratio in the previous year; the asset illiquidity measured by the first-order serial correlation of monthly NAV returns in the previous three years; the management fee in the previous year; an indicator variable (Mgt Ownership) that equals one if more than 10% of common shares were beneficially controlled by board members and executive officers in the previous year; the accumulated unrealized capital gains as a percentage of year-end TNA in the previous year; and the fourfactor alpha based on the monthly NAV returns in the previous three years. All variables except the indicator variables are standardized by subtracting the mean and scaling by the standard deviation of all funds in any given year. We also control for style fixed effects based on the Wall Street Journal style classification. We report the correlation coefficient (Rho) between the two error terms. The Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors are calculated. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance of 1% and 5% are indicated by** and * respectively. This table investigates the determinants of preemptive vs. reactive MDP adoptions using probit regressions. The probability is calculated for preemptive MDP adoption. The explanatory variables include share illiquidity measured by the Amihud illiquidity ratio, asset illiquidity measured by the AR1 coefficient based on the NAV returns, leverage ratio, and four-factor alpha. All variables are measured as the annual averages during the 5-year window from 3 years before and 2 years after the MDP adoption year. We convert all variables into ranks between 0 and 1. We also construct a relative illiquidity measure (share illiquidity relative to asset illiquidity) by calculating the difference between the share illiquidity rank and the asset illiquidity rank. 
Online Appendix H: Toeholds and MDP size
Below is the scatter plot to which Section 3.7 refers: Figure 
Online Appendix I: Missing Data
In the tests performed in the text, some funds were not used. This was either because data was not available for these funds or because the funds did not fit the criteria for the test (e.g., they
were outside the observation window specified for the test). Out of 22 reactive MDP funds, we exclude 1 fund due to missing discount data in the event window.
Because Tables 3 and 4 are missing a sizeable portion of the funds, we address the concern that their results are skewed. Table A8 , below, repeats the analysis done in Table 3 of the text including the missing funds. As can be seen from the Table A8 , the results are similar or stronger. To assess the impact of missing funds on Table 4 , we compare the empirical distributions for the sample used in Table 4 with the full MDP sample for a list of key variables.
As Table A9 suggests, the distributions are similar between the two samples, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests fail to reject the equality of two distributions across all key variables.
We have little reason, therefore, to suspect that our results are driven by selection bias. [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , the changes relative to year 2000, and the difference-in-difference results. In both panels, we compute the mean (median) statistics for the following variables: average management fee (%), average year-end TNA ($ million), average annual managerial pay (average monthly net assets in million dollars * percentage management fee), and average discount (%). Statistical significance for the mean (median) tests of 1% and 5% are indicated by ** and * respectively. Table 4 and the full MDP sample. The key variables include year-end TNA, average monthly discount in the year, total annual distribution normalized by year-beginning NAV, share illiquidity measured by the average daily Amihud illiquidity ratio of fund shares in the year, asset illiquidity measured by the first-order serial correlation of monthly NAV returns in the past 36 months, leverage ratio defined as year-end liabilities normalized by year-end total assets, and management fee ratio. All variables are standardized by subtracting the mean and scaling by the standard deviation of all funds in any given year. For each standardized variable, we first calculate the time series average over years for each fund and then derive empirical distributions across funds. For the MDP sample used in Table 4 Test  P95  P75  P50  P25  P5  P95  P75  P50  P25  P5  Pvalue 
